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1. Introduction
In economics two important drivers of firm performance are competition and ownership or
governance. The organisation of markets and firms influences incentives, performance, and
welfare.
Agency theories suggest that both private ownership and competition provide strong incen-
tives to improve technical efficiency (the main source of static welfare gains besides allocative
efficiency). Managers of privately owned firms in competitive markets face high powered incen-
tives to increase firm productivity. Utility industry reforms throughout the 1980s and 1990s
were influenced by these theoretical predictions (Winston, 1993). Utility industry reforms also
provide good cases for economists to assess these theoretical predictions empirically, because
often panel data on physical inputs and outputs is available, because control groups are often
present, and because treated plants usually continue operation, which allows for the identifica-
tion on incentive effects as opposed to selection effects (Fabrizio et al., 2007, p. 1253).
We study the effects of privatisation and competition on plant productivity for Great Britain’s
(GB) electric industry reforms, starting with restructuring and privatisation (R&P) in 1990/1991
and following competition reforms throughout the 1990s. The GB case is of interest, because it
was one of the earliest and most pervasive utility industry reforms in the world. Also, an early
reform focus on privatisation and a later focus on effective competition allow us to assess the
relative importance of both reform steps.
Although there is a large number of studies assessing utility industry reforms, including UK
privatisation programmes, (for an overview of the reform literature see Pollitt (2012)) there are
few detailed plant or firm level studies on productivity performance. Two important exceptions
are Fabrizio et al. (2007) and Gao and Van Biesebroeck (2014) on US and Chinese electric
industry reform, respectively. In particular, there are few firm or plant level studies of actual
privatisations (e.g. Waddams Price andWeyman-Jones (1996)). Most studies analyse ownership
effects using either before-after or cross-sectional comparisons only (Shirley and Walsh, 2000;
Pollitt, 1995). To our best knowledge ours is the first study to analyse the causal effects of
one of the UK’s privatisation programmes at the plant-level. Newbery and Pollitt (1997),
using a simulated counterfactual, were the first to perform a social cost-benefit analysis for the
privatisation of the UK’s electricity supply industry.
Our empirical approach is to model plant-level productivity as a set of input demand func-
tions derived from a behavioural model of cost minimisation, following Biesebroeck (2003) and
Fabrizio et al. (2007). Plant-level, short-run productivity proxies for management performance.
The reform effects can only be disentangled at the plant-level, because other factors like fuel
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mix cannot be controlled for when using aggregate data. Also, our plant-level analysis allows us
to control for selection using plant fixed effects as well as contrasting results for an unbalanced
and balanced sample. Last, we instrument for the potentially endogenous supply variable in
input demand. We analyse the causal effects of the reforms on performance using a standard
difference-in-difference approach. Most previous studies assume that the break date is known.
In contrast, we estimate unknown break dates, because the timing of the economic impact might
be different from the official reform dates or there might be no official reform date at all as for
instance, when collusion breaks down. We search for structural breaks in technical efficiency for
a window of years around R&P using the criterion suggested by (Bai, 2010). We then map the
estimated break dates to the known reform history (Freeman, 2005). Our control group is the
performance of comparable, publicly owned, US power plants. This cross-country comparison
minimises the risk that treatment effects spill over to the control group.
We collected unique plant-level input-output data for a sample GB electricity generation
plants for the years 1981 to 2004 and matched it with an extended version of the data used by
Fabrizio et al. (2007) for US, publicly owned plants.
We find that privatisation in 1990/1991 increased labour productivity by about 50 per cent
but did not increase fuel productivity at all. The large increase in labour productivity is not
predominantly driven by selection but is also too large to be due to incentives only. As discussed
in previous studies it also reflects changed management objectives as well as the loosening of
political constraints; in particular lower union power. Privatisation probably did not increase
fuel productivity because the publicly owned firm had a culture that valued fuel productivity
and because competitive pressure was weak right after privatisation. Increased competition,
probably through divestitures, increased fuel productivity by up to 15 per cent in the second
half of the 1990s. Competition also increased labour productivity but the effect is strongly
dominated by privatisation.
The outline is as follows. Section 2 provides some background information on GB electricity
R&P. Section 3 summarises the relevant literature. Section 4 describes our empirical approach.
Section 5 describes the data. Section 6 gives the results and section 7 concludes.
2. Background
Before R&P, the generation and transmission of electricity in England & Wales was the re-
sponsibility of the Central Electricity Generation Board (CEGB), a horizontally and vertically
integrated state-owned monopoly. Distribution in England & Wales was the responsibility of
12 regional monopolies, the Area Boards. In Scotland and Northern Ireland vertically inte-
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grated, regional monopolies were responsible for generation, transmission and distribution.1
Even though the Scottish reform process was slightly different, we include Scottish plants in
this study. Northern Irish plants are excluded, because Northern Ireland was not interconnected
with Great Britain during our sample period.
A first attempt to liberalise the market was undertaken in 1983 when the Energy Act required
the Area Boards to buy energy from independent (non-CGEB) generators at avoided cost. We
do not have a long enough sample to assess this reform. As the Act did not protect entrants
from anti-competitive behaviour by the incumbent the reform was ineffective (Vickers et al.,
1991). Eventually, restructuring of English and Welsh companies began in March 1988 and
was completed in March 1990. And they were privatised the following year in March 1991.
In Scotland the industry was also privatised in 1991 but was not restructured immediately.2
Restructuring in England and Wales comprised the vertical unbundling of generation and trans-
mission as well as the horizontal separation of generation.3 Generation assets were separated
into four companies: all fossil-fuel plants were divided between PowerGen and National Power
(our sample), the new transmission company National Grid obtained pumped storage plants,
and Nuclear Electric the nuclear plants. Sixty percent of the shares in PowerGen and National
Power were sold to the public in 1991. The remaining shares were sold in February 1995 but
there is no evidence that the government kept any direct control after 1991. Part of Nuclear
Electric was only privatised in 1996 (as British Energy) and is not included in this study. The
Area Boards and the transmission company became private, regulated monopolies.
Even though a deregulated wholesale market was established at R&P, competition amoung
electricity generators was not effective, because National Power and PowerGen formed a duopoly
for fossil-fuel generation (Sweeting, 2007). Government gave the newly private firms market
power to increase the sales price at privatisation (Henney, 2010, p. 37). Moreover, the rules
of the newly established wholesale market, referred to as the Pool, facilitated the exercise of
market power (Green, 2006). Also, at R&P only sales to industrial (above 10 MW) but not
retail customers were deregulated (partly to burden retail customers with the high cost of British
coal). Prices for smaller customers were deregulated in stages until retail was fully deregulated
in 1999.
A few years after R&P high electricity prices and profits shifted the focus from ownership to
competition. Between 1994 to 1996 the regulator set a wholesale price cap. Full privatisation
1Whereas Scotland had two companies, Northern Ireland only had a single electricity company.
2See Pollitt (1997) and Pollitt (1999) for a discussion of the Northern Irish and Scottish cases, respectively.
3In the US restructuring often refers to the introduction of competition, i.e. market liberalisation.
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in 1995 certainly removed any conflict of interest for the government concerning competition.
The main tool to increase competition was to reduce market concentration through divestitures
which came in two rounds in 1996 and 1999. There is evidence that only the second round
changed firm behaviour. In the first round plants were leased to a single competitor and lease
contracts were such that the new owner had no incentive to compete (Henney, 2010, p. 37).
Sweeting (2007) provides evidence that firms (tacitly) colluded throughout the second half of
the 1990s. In 1999 the incumbents sold plants to various (mostly US) investors in return for
regulatory permission to vertically integrate with the supply function. For example, Edison
Mission bought two plants in 1999 and increased output by 30% (Newbery, 2004, p. 18), which
is unlikely to be the result of efficiency increases alone. Probably, the entry of US firms in the
late 1990s ended tacit collusion between the generators. Market concentration for generation
decreased considerably throughout the 1990s. The Herfindahl Hirschman index, a measure of
market concentration, for coal fired plant had dropped by 1999 to a fifth of its value in 1990.
Nevertheless, the regulator judged that in the Pool “prices had failed to properly reflect a more
competitive generation market and falling generation input costs” (Ofgem, 2002, p. 1) and
changed the wholesale market rules. The new market design, referred to as the New Electricity
Trading Arrangements (NETA), was introduced in 2001. There is evidence that allocative
efficiency increased around the year 2000 but there is a debate about whether reduced market
concentration or the new market rules were responsible. Whereas Newbery (2004) attributes
lower wholesale prices to the change in market structure just before the introduction of NETA,
Evans and Green (2003) argue that behaviour changed in anticipation of the new market rules.
In addition to the reforms that directly affected ownership and competition other policies
affected generators. Henney (2010, p. 37) argues that the cause for efficiency improvements
was neither ownership change nor increased competition but the “freedom [...] from the politics
that had traditionally enmeshed [the industry].” After R&P, two major constraints on plant’s
input decision were removed. First, union power was greatly diminished (both at the coal mines
and power plants). Second, constraints on the overall fuel mix, mainly to protect the domestic
coal industry, were gradually removed throughout the 1990s. From R&P until 1994 and to
a lesser degree till 1998 the incumbent generators were committed to buying certain amounts
of British coal at above world market prices, the cost of which could be passed on to captive
retail customers (Newbery, 1998). It was intended to let these coal contracts expire once retail
competition was extended to all customers in 1998. Starting in about 1993 gas was increasingly
substituted for coal (the “dash for gas”). Low capital cost and low gas prices made gas the fuel
of choice (Newbery, 1994). As new gas capacity grew much faster than demand many coal-fired
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Figure 1: The UK’s Fuel Use in Electricity Generation
Notes: The graphs plots aggregate UK fuel input (measured in million tons of coal equivalent). The data source
is the Digest of UK Energy Statistics (DUKES).
plants were closed prematurely. To increase the comparability between GB and US plants we
focus on coal in the analysis below. Figure 1 illustrates these changes in the aggregate fuel mix
for the period 1970 to 2005 using data from the Digest of UK energy statistics (DUKES). There
seem to be no major changes in fuel mix in the decade before R&P (except the substitution of
oil for coal during the miner’s strike in 1984). After R&P, between 1993 and 1999 gas grows
rapidly at the expense of coal. The substitution of gas for coal stopped in 1999. Between
1998 and 2000, out of concern for dwindling British coal sales and increasing dependence on
gas the government made it more difficult to obtain licenses for new gas-fired stations (the gas
“moratorium”).
3. Literature
The general argument about the effect of competition on performance goes as follows (Nickell,
1996; Shirley and Walsh, 2000). For manager-owned firms, more competitive pressure increases
incentives to operate more efficiently. If a firm’s efficiency is too low it will be driven out of
the market by its more efficient competitors. This is often referred to as the incentive effect.
The incentive effect also operates for firms that separate ownership and control. But here part
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of the effect is indirect via improved information for owners. Owners rely on competitors (as
comparators) to control the rent seeking of employed managers. Of course, also the owners of
monopoly firms want to control rent seeking by managers but with asymmetric information and
no competitive benchmark they struggle to do so. Agency theory recognises the importance
of asymmetric information and incentives under the separation of ownership and control for
management behaviour. Management is considered intrinsically “effort-averse” (Fabrizio et al.,
2007).
As such, these considerations apply equally to privately and publicly owned firms in com-
petitive markets.4 But is it possible that even in competitive markets public firms perform
worse? Or, that private monopolies perform better than public monopolies? The controversy
around privatisations suggests that ownership affects performance independently. First, taking
into account public choice theory, public owners might not have profit maximisation as their
(only) objective. Technical inefficiency might arise, because public owners have a preference
for more labour intensive operation (machines do not vote) or favour the intensive use of local
or national fuels. Newbery (1995) provided anecdotal evidence, that after R&P there was a
“change in culture of CEGB, where being base and max. thermal efficiency must change to
value flexibility”. It is debatable whether efficiency changes due to changes in objectives should
be counted as such.
Second, Alchian (1965) argued, that even if public owners maximise profit, more dispersed
ownership (all voters) and the inability to sell (except through privatisation) gives public owners
relatively little influence over management.5
Shirley and Walsh (2000) summarised the literature on the performance effects of competition
and ownership. They concluded, that more competition and private ownership positively affect
firm performance. And, that on balance, both the theory and the empirical evidence point
towards a dominance of the ownership effect over the competition effect.
There is a sizable literature on the effects of public ownership and privatisations on firm
performance. Whereas studies that make cross-sectional comparisons across ownership types
(Pollitt, 1995; Arocena and Waddams Price, 2002) find little difference D’souza and Megginson
(1999) found that actual privatisations increased performance including labour productivity
for a sample of 85 privatisations over the years 1990 to 1996. But there is a question about
4Ownership and competition are not necessarily independent. When competition is not feasible public ownership
is a possible response to the regulatory problems associated with asymmetric information.
5Public ownership might affect allocative efficiency because public owners more likely to internalise any ex-
ternalities from power plant operation. That is increases of technical efficiency at the plant level do not
necessarily correlate with welfare improvements. Two externalities that private owner might disregard are
effects on system stability (including optimal investment in the long-run) and pollution.
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whether the effect is due to actual privatisation or related changes to management and firm or
market structure (Pollitt, 2000) which highlights the importance of searching for an unknown
break date as we do below. Also, Newbery (1998, p. 3) argued that it is unlikely that perfor-
mance improvements were due to ownership change. He observed, that Nuclear Electric, which
was exposed to competition in 1990/91 but itself only privatised in 1996 experienced similar
performance improvements as other generators. Pollitt (1997) found a similar result for the
privatisation of the electricity industry in Northern Ireland.
Recently, a number of papers have investigated the effects of ownership and competition for
utility industries. Fabrizio et al. (2007) studied the impact of US electric industry restructuring
(the introduction of wholesale and possibly retail competition) on plant productivity. They
analysed the impact of ownership and competition on the efficiency of US electricity generation
plants and found that investor-owned utilities (IOUs) in restructuring states reduced non-fuel
expenses by up to 5 percent, labour input by 3 percent, and fuel input by up to 1.4 percent
(the latter being statistically insignificant) in comparison to firms in non-restructuring states.
They also used an alternative counterfactual, municipality owned plants (we use the same data
below), and found that for labour and non-fuel expenses the effect of restructuring is about
twice as large. This implies either, that IOUs in non-restructuring states are not a good control
group, because restructuring had spill-over effects or, that the effect of ownership adds to the
effect of competition and both effects are about the same size. Somewhat surprisingly, they
found no economically or statistically significant effect for fuel efficiency. This might be due
to the omitted effects of incentive regulation. Bushnell and Wolfram (2005) found that both
divestiture, i.e. the sale to non-utility owners and incentive regulation, which tries to mimic
the effects of competition, for plants that remain in utility ownership increased fuel efficiency
by about 2 per cent. Hiebert (2002) analysed the effects of ownership and restructuring on
cost efficiency for a sample of US generation plants for the years 1988-1997. He found that
restructuring increased efficiency for coal-fired but not for gas-fired power plants. He found
only mixed evidence for the effect of ownership. Gao and Van Biesebroeck (2014) found that
after restructuring in 2002, publicly as opposed to privately owned Chinese generation plants
saw larger increases in labour and material (including fuel) efficiency. Although, the effect
occurred with a lag of at least two years. We take their results as evidence that publicly owned
firms, respond to incentives at least as well as privately owned firms.
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4. Empirical Model
4.1. Production
The empirical analysis of productivity change requires a model of the production technology.
We apply the model developed by Biesebroeck (2003) and Fabrizio et al. (2007), because it
represents accurately the short-run production function of an electricity generation plant. In
particular, it accurately models the temporal sequence of input decisions and the resulting con-
straints on short-run input substitution. Here short-run productivity is a proxy for management
performance.
We model actual production as the minimum of planned (or “probable”) output, which is a
function of capital and labour, and fuel input. Actual output (observed by the researcher) could
be more or less than planned output, because actual demand differs from expected demand or,
because of unexpected changes in plant availability. Actual output QA for plant i in year t takes
the following Leontief form:
QAit = min[g
(
Eit,ΓE , Eit
)
, QPit
(
Ki, Lit,ΓP , Pit
)
exp
(
Ait
)
]. (1)
Actual output is a function of probable or planned output QP and fuel input g (·). Γ denotes
coefficient vectors and  represents error terms. If planned output is not constrained, QA =
QP exp
(
Ait
)
, i.e. actual output equals probable output multiplied by a shock that is observed
by the plant manager at the time of actual production. Pit is observed by the plant manager
but at the time of planning. As errors are not observed by the researcher we have to take into
account simultaneity bias. Planned output is a function of capital K and labour L, but capital
is not indexed by t to reflect the short-run nature of the production function. Planned output
is not a function of fuel, because the amount of fuel is determined by actual output. Intuitively,
whereas the amounts of non-fuel inputs are chosen before production takes place fuel input
depends on actual production. This production function allows for medium-run decisions on
labour but does not allow labour to substitute for fuel in the short-run. Also, neither in the
medium nor the short-run can the plant manager substitute capital.
From this production function we now derive factor demands for labour and fuel. The Leontief
form allows us to derive these demands separately. We derive labour demand assuming cost-
minimisation behaviour constrained by a Cobb-Douglas production function for probable output
QPit = Q0 (Ki)L
ρ
itexp
(
Pit
)
.6 Given a short-run objective function that minimises labour cost,
6The assumption of cost-minimisation might be restrictive as it is likely that the CEGB (and possibly the
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minWit × Lit, we can derive the following labour demand equation:
lnLit = α0 + lnQAit − lnWit − Ait , (2)
where labour L is a function of actual output QA, the wage W , and a constant α0 = ln (λρ),
which has two components: the Lagrangian multiplier or shadow value of changes in the output
constraint λ and the labour parameter ρ or marginal productivity from the production function.
The derivation of the fuel demand follows a different strategy as the fuel input is not part of
the optimisation problem used to derive the demand for labour. We only need to assume that
g (·) is monotonically increasing in fuel E and inversion produces the following fuel demand
equation:
lnEit = γQlnQAit + Eit , (3)
where γ is the output coefficient. Unlike for labour the fuel demand function does not depend
on price as the price of fuel only enters indirectly through the output the plant is dispatched to
produce as the fuel price affects the merit order. We need to expand these theoretical demand
equations by a set of indicators to perform our difference-in-difference estimation.
As we are interested in comparing productivity before and after treatment and between
treatment and control group we use the following identification strategy. We control for plant
fixed effects αi to control for any cross-sectional differences across plants like technology or
regulatory regimes. We control for year fixed effects to control for technological progress for all
plants αt. And we use an indicator if a plant is in the treatment group and treatment period
δgt∀i ∈ g. Accordingly, we expand the subscript by g to indicate whether a plant is treated.
We also add an error term L to capture measurement error for the input. The resulting labour
demand equation is:
lnLigt = αi + αt + δg + lnQAigt − lnWigt − Aigt + Ligt . (4)
We add further controls to the reduced form equation, in particular proxies for the output
constraint λ. We include a variable for plant age (AGE) to control for vintage. Joskow and
Schmalensee (1987) found that plant performance “deteriorates significantly” with age. How-
ever, Hiebert (2002) showed that length of service might actually increase performance as plant
privatised plants) did neither maximise productive nor allocative efficiency. Also the focus on the short run
might underestimate the benefits of R&P as Arocena and Waddams Price (2002) find that private generators
have a higher allocative efficiency in the long run.
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management learns to better operate the plant. Pollitt (1995, p. 132) found no significant age
effect for a sample of base load plants. We control for capital using net capacity (CAP) and the
presence of SO2 (FGD) abatement technology. We also control for load factor (LF), as the scale
at which a plant operates affects productivity. After R&P plants might have been called upon
in a different order (their position in the merit order changed), which would affect performance
(Knittel, 2002). The load factor might also control for different operating patterns. Bushnell
and Wolfram (2005, p. 2) state that “irregular operating patterns motivated by attempts to
exercise market power and the disruption of an ownership change could diminish operating
efficiency at least in the short-run”. The reduced form labour demand equation is
lnLigt = αi + αt + δg + βN1 lnNET GWHigt + β2lnWigt (5)
+ β3FGDigt + β4AGEigt + β5LFigt + β6lnCAPigt + eigt ,
where the error term e combines the deviation from planned output A and the input specific
error L. The reduced form for fuel (not shown) is identical but omits the wage variable.
Due to unobserved productivity shocks supply is probably not exogenous. Following Fabrizio
et al. (2007) we use state level sales, a demand proxy, as an instrument for plant supply. For the
US we extend the Energy Information Agency’s series for state level sales used by Fabrizio et al.
(2007). For GB we have to use national sales as regional sales data are not available. We use the
final electricity consumption series from the National Statistics’ “Energy consumption in the
United Kingdom” publication. Our IV estimator is a two-stage least squares within estimator.
Another source of endogeneity is attrition even though for electricity plants it is unlikely that
negative productivity shocks lead to exit. A greater worry is that the reform led to the exit of
low productivity (time invariant) coal-fired plants, especially as in GB after privatisation gas
became an attractive fuel. To analyse the influence of selection we also use a balanced sample
as described below.
4.2. Structural break
Unlike many previous studies we do not assume that the timing of the effects is known. The
reason is that even though the dates of the reform steps are known there are likely to be
implementation lags or leads. Also, for a given reform step, like increasing competition, there
are multiple dates. Using a wrong date would lead to a wrong estimate for the effect size. We
identify the effects of R&P and subsequent changes to market structure and competition as
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unknown breakpoints across time as proposed by Piehl et al. (2003).
Although there is a vast literature on the estimation of structural breaks for time series data
the literature on structural breaks for panel data is surprisingly small. We follow the recent
work of Bai (2010) and estimate common breaks across panels (i.e. plants). The estimator
for the break is the global minimum of the sum of squared residuals (SSR) of the unrestricted
model (i.e. including a break) in a least squares framework. Inference for a break relies on the
assumption that errors are independent in the time series and in the cross-section. Also, this
procedure assumes that there is a break. That is we cannot formally test the Null hypothesis of
no break for a given candidate break date because unlike for time series data or for cases where
the break date is known, the critical values are not known. But as the GB reforms were drastic
this assumption should not be restrictive. Also, there is no econometric theory that allows
us to test for the number of breaks for panel data. We will search for two breaks, a primary
and a secondary break. To identify multiple breaks Bai (1997) proposed an iterative procedure
where a first break is identified, then the sample is split at the break, and each sub-sample is
tested for additional breaks. Across the two sub-samples the break with the largest absolute
drop in SSR is chosen as the secondary break. Once a second break date is determined we
can go back to investigate whether is first break date is still valid when the sample is split at
the secondary break date. This procedure, referred to as refinement, assesses the robustness
of the (first) break date. Bai (2010) pointed out that panel data is particularly suited for
estimating multiple breaks, because the additional cross-sectional information allows for the
robust estimation of relatively short regimes (the period between two breaks). Bai (2010) also
provided confidence intervals for the break dates.
Our window for candidate break dates is 1983 to 2002 leaving two years out at each end of
the sample. As explained by Bai (2010) the additional cross-sectional information allows for
the robust identification of breaks close to the extremes and does not require a substantial trim
factor as with pure time series data. The window opens almost a decade before R&P and closes
one year after the introduction of NETA in 2001.
Endogeneity might bias the coefficient estimate of the effect size, δ in (5), but it does not
bias the test for structural change (Perron and Yamamoto, 2008). Actually, break tests based
on instrumental variable (IV) regressors are less precise than tests based on standard OLS
regressors as IV regressors have less quadratic variation. Therefore, we use a least squares
estimator to estimate the break date and size. And we test whether the estimate of the size
(but not the timing) of the break is robust to the use of an IV estimator as described above.
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5. Data and Summary Statistics
5.1. Great Britain
We collected generation plant data for physical inputs and outputs from various sources. First,
we collected all data that is publicly available, e.g. from industry statistical yearbooks, firm
reports, government. Second, we contacted firms directly to obtain additional data. Third, we
intrapolated missing observations for supply and fuel using engineering science as detailed in
the appendix. Though filling gaps this way requires some assumptions we believe it is better
than having missing observations. Where all variables are missing gaps in the data remain.
There is a gap in the number of observed plants during restructuring (1988 and 1989), because
the CEGB stopped publishing statistical yearbooks. There is also a smaller gap in 1997. We
cannot say that the missing values are entirely random in the time-series. But we have no
reason to believe that the same is true for the cross-section. That is, for instance, even though
the gap before R&P is endogenous, it is unlikely that only low or high productivity plants have
missing values. The resulting sample is an unbalanced panel for the years 1981 and 2004. We
have a total of 909 plant-year observations for the fuel demand equation and 535 for the labour
demand equation. About a third of all observations are for the US. We restrict our sample to
coal fired plants to maximise comparability over time and with the US. Coal fired electricity
generation is a well defined technology that should not vary much over time or across the two
countries. To investigate the effects of selection we also use a “balanced” sample where the
requirement is that we observe a plant, possibly with gaps for individual variables, for at least
20 out of 24 years (there are too few plants observed for the entire sample length). All variables
and their measurements are listed in Table 1.
Some variables are corrected. Whereas some firms report for financial years others report
for calendar years. We correct for this by constructing calendar year data from the weighted
financial year data (weights are simply the number of months). We drop observations just after
the plant is installed or just before it is shut down because in these years plants do not operate
regularly. We measure the presence of FGD by plant level dummies. Plants typically consist of
several units and the fitting of abatement technology typically occurs over several years, unit
by unit. The FGD dummy takes the value 1 if the first unit is fitted.
Wage data is not available at the plant level. We take gross, weekly, regional wages from the
New Earnings Survey (published by the UK Office for National Statistics). As the series only
goes back to 1986 we use linear extrapolation to fill the gaps to 1981.
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Table 1: Variables and Measurement
Variable Definition
Fuel Mtce/year
Labour number of employees/year
Output net GWh/year
Capacity net MW
FGD 1 if FGD fitted; 0 otherwise
Age number of years since first unit com-
missioned
Load factor Proportion
Wage regional, gross, weekly, pounds at
market exchanges rates
POST structural break indicator: 1 if
year >= year of break and coun-
try==GB; 0 otherwise
5.2. United States
For the US, we start with the data used by Fabrizio et al. (2007) which is available as an online
appendix to their paper. As our control group we use cooperatively and publicly (municipal or
federal) owned plants in both restructuring and non-restructuring states. According to Fabrizio
et al. (2007, p. 1259) US restructuring did not change the competitive environment for public
utilities, except in Arizona and Arkansas which we exclude. Excluding restructuring states
decreases the number of plants in the control group from 19 to 11 and does not change the
quality of our results. Also, we restrict our US sample to states that have a climate comparable
to GB. That is, we only include states whose average summer temperature is below 22 ◦C
and whose annual average temperature is between 6 and 12 ◦Celsius.7 We then extend their
data to 2004 using commercially available data from Platts. We also extend all other variables
using publicly available data. We extend the wage data using the Bureau of Labor Statistics’
Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages series. Doing so we have to deal with a change
from the SIC to the NAICS industry classification system. The original series is for SIC 4911
(Electric Services). We extend it using NAICS 221112 (Fossil Fuel Electric Power Generation).
Table 2 compares the means between GB and the US plants. In terms of capacity GB plants
are about twice as large as US plants but have a lower load factor. Plants have a similar vintage.
Wages are about double in the US (at market exchange rates).
7US plants are from the following states: Colorado, Michigan, New Mexico, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Utah, and
Wisconsin.
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Table 2: Comparison of Means
US GB Difference
(t− statistic)
Fuel (mtce) 1.19 2.11 0.92∗∗∗
(0.13)
Output (net GWh) 3204.70 5401.54 2196.84∗∗∗
(338.08)
Capacity (net MW) 604.42 1178.32 573.90∗∗∗
(56.31)
Load factor 0.59 0.47 −0.12∗∗∗
(0.01)
Wage (pound, gross weekly) 481.72 242.23 −239.49∗∗∗
(7.63)
Age (years) 24.17 24.56 0.39
(0.71)
6. Results
Our difference-in-difference identification strategy assumes that factor productivities for the
treatment and control groups follow a common trend. To investigate whether this assumption
holds we estimate our two input demand equations without regime indicators but including
group specific year fixed effects (with base year 1991). Figure 2 plots the estimated year effects
which give the input productivities relative to the base year. We see in the upper panel that
for labour the productivity trends are similar for the two groups. We also see that there is a
clear productivity increase in GB in 1990. In the bottom panel we see that the pre-privatisation
productivity trends are similar for fuel, too.8 For fuel, productivity breaks are not so apparent
but probably GB’s fuel productivity decreased in 1989 and increased in 1993. The following
regression analysis that models breaks explicitly, largely confirms these observations.
8These findings also corroborate the common trends assumption made by Newbery and Pollitt (1997).
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Figure 2: Trend comparison
Notes: The graphs plot the coefficient estimates and their 95% confidence intervals for group specific fixed effects
(relative to the base year 1991 by country). Great Britain is the treatment group and the United States is the
control group. A positive (negative) estimate represents a decrease (increase) in productivity relative to the base
year.
Now we present the results for the estimate of the break date and the corresponding estimate
of the effect size, i.e. the input efficiency difference between any two regimes as separated by
the break date. As we estimated input demands, a positive (negative) intercept change implies
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a decrease (increase) in input efficiency. Following our theoretical model we estimated breaks
separately for each input: labour and fuel.
Figure 3a gives the results for the labour demand equation for the unbalanced sample. For
each candidate break date that separates two regimes the graph plots the sum of squared
residuals (left axis), where the minimum is our estimate for the primary break date. The
graph also plots, for each possible break date, the estimated percentage effect for δ using the
approximation [exp (δ − 1)]×100. The percentage effect is given for both the OLS and, allowing
for the endogeneity of supply, the IV estimator. For the labour demand equation the F-statistic
for the excluded instrument in the first stage is 6.88 (significant at a 1 per cent level).
The estimate of the primary break date is the year of R&P, 1991. This estimate is robust to
refinement, i.e. the estimate is the same when we split the sample at the secondary break date
and repeat the search. This estimate of the break date is subject to uncertainty; Bai (2010)
showed that the 95 per cent confidence interval for the break date (as well as for all dates
below) is 5 periods, that is 2.5 years either side of the break. The break in 1991 is associated
with an increase of labour productivity of about 50 per cent (irrespective of whether supply is
considered exogenous or not).
Table 4 in the Appendix reports all coefficient estimates for the labour demand equation for
break date 1991. The statistical significance of the treatment effect (POST1991) is high, which
is relevant only assuming the break date is known. As we assume that the true break date
is unknown we are unable to test whether a break exists at all or not. Note that the Cobb-
Douglas form assumes that the supply coefficient is 1, which is clearly not the case although
the IV estimate is much higher (but also estimated less precisely) than the OLS estimate.
The higher IV estimate implies a negative correlation between input shocks and output. For
instance, a output reducing plant break down might require more labour. The same negative
correlation holds for the fuel demand equation below.
These results might be driven by plant selection, in particular the exit of low productivity
plants after R&P. Figure 3b presents the labour productivity results for a balanced sample
(remember our definition of “balanced” above). We see that for the year 1991 the effect size is
not much lower, which suggest that the effect is not mainly driven by selection. But instead of
investigating the robustness of the effect size only we repeat the entire analysis for the balanced
sample. The estimate of the break date is 1992 (one year later) and the estimated effect size is
lower, especially for the IV estimator (about 38 per cent).
Our hypothesis is that there are two breaks due to the differential timing of privatisation and
competition. To estimate a secondary break date we split the sample at the primary break date.
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Across the two resulting sub-samples the break date with the largest drop in SSR is the estimate
of the secondary break. For the unbalanced sample that is 1994, one year before plants where
fully privatised (see Table 3). Note that using the 5 year confidence interval we cannot statis-
tically tell the primary and secondary break dates apart. This secondary break is associated
with a 25 per cent increase in labour productivity (21% for the IV estimator) suggesting that
the overall increase in labour productivity of 50 per cent occurred over a number of years. The
secondary break date for the balanced sample is 1990 associated with an productivity increase
of about 19 per cent. Table 3 at the end of this section summarises all the estimates for the
break dates and associated effects.
What do these breaks tell us about the likely effect of ownership change and competition on
labour productivity? There is clear evidence for a break associated with the initial restructuring
and privatisation in 1990/1991. In accordance with the pervasive nature of GB reform, compared
for instance to the US reform, the labour productivity effect is large but consistent with firm
aggregate data (Newbery and Pollitt, 1997, Table 1). However, the large size suggests that the
incentive effect is not the only relevant mechanism. There are other mechanism whose effects
we cannot separate. For instance, it is likely that management’s objective changed from labour
input maximisation to profit maximisation. Also, with privatisation union power was reduced
making it much easier to lay off staff.9 And, our measure of head count might underestimate
the true labour input after privatisation. For instance, working hours might have increased and
more outsourced labour employed. None of our estimated break dates for labour productivity
coincides with changes to market structure and competition. But when we assume that the
date for increased competition is 1999, the year when fuel productivity increased (see below),
we find a positive effect on labour productivity. Nevertheless, for labour any competition effect
is dominated by the privatisation effect.
9From anecdotes we also know that voluntary redundancy and early retirement arrangements were very generous.
But these should be included in the cost-benefit calculation of the firm.
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Figure 3: Test for Structural Change: Labour Demand
Notes: The graphs plot the Sum of Squared Residuals (SSR) for the labour demand equation including a break
between two regimes on the left axis. The droplines represent the (OLS and IV) point estimate of the break
indicator as an estimate of the average change in input efficiency between any two regimes. The SSR and
coefficient estimates are plotted over the different candidate break dates.
Next, we repeat the analysis for fuel demand. Figure 4a gives the results for the unbalanced
sample. Note that for fuel the break window starts 2 years later in 1985. The reason is
that an initial analysis suggested both 1983 and 1984 as primary break dates. But as both
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dates are associated with decreases in fuel efficiency which are unlikely to be related to the
reforms of the 1990s we decided to ignore them and start the analysis later. The estimate
of the primary break date is the year 1999, the year when market concentration decreased,
retail was fully deregulated, and new market rules announced. The break is associated with
a 7.2 per cent increase in fuel efficiency. There is doubt about this break date, because it is
not robust to refinement. Refinement suggests that the primary break date is 1995, the year
of full privatisation and the year before the first round of divestitures. Also unlike for labour
the IV estimator produces a much larger effect: about 13 per cent productivity increase. For
the fuel demand equation the F-statistic for the excluded instrument in the first stage is 17.44
(significant at a 0.1 per cent level). The significantly higher supply elasticity for the IV estimator
than the OLS estimator in Table 5 suggests that the IV estimate might be closer to the true
effect. This is as expected, because fuel input decisions are much more likely to be affected by
unobserved productivity shocks than labour input decisions.
For the balanced sample in Figure 4b we see that the effect size in 1999 is slightly smaller at
10 per cent, again suggesting that the effect is not mainly due to selection. However, when we
also re-estimate the break date, the year is 1995, suggesting there might be a selection effect
after all. The break is associated with a fuel productivity increase of 7.5 and 14.7 per cent
for the OLS and IV estimators, respectively. But again this primary break is not robust to
refinement. Refinement suggests that the primary break is 1990 associated with a decrease in
fuel productivity of about 6 per cent.
For the unbalanced panel the estimate of the secondary break is the year 1988, the year
restructuring began. Surprisingly, it is associated with a decrease in fuel productivity between
5 and 6 per cent depending on the estimator. One possible explanation is that this break
is an artifact of the drop in the number of GB observations in 1988 (Dukpa Kim, private
communication). That we do not find the same break for our balanced sample is evidence
for this hypothesis. A possible substantial explanation is that the decrease reflects a loss of
economies of scope with the beginning of restructuring. Last, given the uncertainty around
the timing of the break, it is possible that the newly created private generators’ strategic
interaction reduced productivity due to frequent output changes. But we discount this last
possible explanation. For the balanced sample the estimate of the secondary break date is 1999,
associated with productivity increases of 8.9 and 15.4 per cent for the OLS and IV estimators,
respectively.
Before interpreting these results for fuel productivity we should note that overall the results
are much less robust than for labour. We believe this reflects the fact that fuel productivity is
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more affected by the competition related reforms. As competition was enhanced through several
smaller reform steps it might be more difficult to pin-point two break dates. Ignoring robustness,
what do these breaks tell us about the likely effects of ownership change and competition on fuel
productivity? Unlike for labour, privatisation did not increase fuel productivity. Probably this
is because the CEGB valued engineering excellence and in particular fuel efficiency. Moreover,
there is some evidence fuel productivity decreased when restructuring began before privatisation.
We believe this reflects a loss of economies of scope.
We find evidence that fuel productivity increased around the dates when competition was
strengthened in 1995 and 1999. The competition effect is strong, up to 15 per cent, and much
higher than the effect found by for instance Fabrizio et al. (2007). One possible explanation is
that for our quasi-experiment it is less likely that there is spill over from the treatment to the
control group. Also, in the US the switch was from a (well) regulated regime to competition,
whereas in our case the switch was from an unregulated duopoly to effective competition. That
the breaks coincide with both rounds of divestiture suggests that market concentration is an
important mechanism, but ultimately we cannot separate this mechanism from the deregulation
of retail access in 1999 or the change in market rules in 2001.
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Figure 4: Test for Structural Change: Fuel Demand
Notes: The graphs plot the Sum of Squared Residuals (SSR) for the fuel demand equation including a break
between two regimes on the left axis. The droplines represent the (OLS and IV) point estimate of the break
indicator as an estimate of the average change in input efficiency between any two regimes. The SSR and
coefficient estimates are plotted over the different candidate break dates.
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Table 3: Results Overview
Input Unbalanced panel Balanced panel
Primary break Secondary break Primary break Secondary break
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Y ear Effect Size Y ear Size Size Y ear Size Size Y ear Size Size
Labour 1991 −49.87 −50.90 1994 −24.67 −20.98 1992 −48.12 −38.46 1990 −18.86 −17.64
Fuel 1999 −7.19 −12.90 1988 5.90 5.24 1995 −7.46 −14.70 1999 −8.85 −15.38
Notes: This Table gives all the break date estimates and the estimated of the associated effect sizes. Effects are approximated using [exp (δ − 1)]× 100.
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7. Conclusion
Ours is the first study to analyse the effects of GB’s electricity industry reforms on plant-level
productivity. And, it is one of a handful of studies that look at the causal effects of privatisa-
tion and competition on plant-level productivity. Agency theories predict that a change from
public to private ownership and increased competition improve firm performance via improved
managerial incentives and effort. The reason is that without private ownership and competition
employed managers can appropriate rent in the form of slack. Newbery and Pollitt (1997) also
highlight that technical efficiency gains played a much larger role than allocative efficiency gains
in the welfare effects of the GB reform.
We collected plant-level data on output and input quantities for Great Britain and the United
States, our control group. We derived input demand functions for labour and fuel to be able
to identify independent effects for these two short-run inputs. And indeed, the timing and the
effect sizes are different. We employed a standard difference-in-difference approach to estimate
the break dates and the associated effects. Finally, we mapped the estimated break dates to
the history of industry reforms. Instead of assuming that break dates are known we search for
them, because the economic effect might occur at a date different from the recorded reform
date. If firm behaviour includes anticipation (as in models of dynamic collusion) effects might
be leading. On the other hand, if adjustment or learning is necessary effects might be lagging.
Additionally, reform might consist of several small steps, like the introduction of effective com-
petition throughout the 1990s. Searching for a break might result in a better estimate of the
true overall effect than picking one or several of the competing reform dates.
We found that at privatisation labour productivity increased dramatically but the effect is not
predominantly driven by selection. The large effect makes it unlikely that improved management
incentives are the only mechanism. Although, we cannot identify the separate mechanisms the
previous literature suggests that two other mechanism were important. Privatisation changed
management’s (and owners’) objectives. It is conceivable that under public ownership labour
input maximisation was part of management’s objectives whereas after privatisation the most
important objective was economic efficiency. Also, privatisation coincided with the lessening of
union power, actually it was one of the objectives of privatisation. Labour productivity gains
due to lower union power are only an indirect effect of privatisation. When allowing two breaks
we find no change in labour productivity associated with steps to increase competition in the
second half of the 1990s. However, when we assume the reform dates related to competition
are known we do find positive effects. It seems that competition has the expected effect but it
is strongly dominated by the effect of privatisation in our sample.
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Unlike for labour, privatisation did not increase fuel productivity. Actually, we find a decrease
in fuel productivity when the industry was restructured. It seems that public owners encouraged
fuel productivity through a culture that valued engineering excellence (Newbery, 1995). This
was expressed by the practice to switch to a fuel efficiency based merit order during fuel emer-
gencies. The actual decrease in fuel productivity might be explained by a loss of economies of
scope after restructuring. Also, improving economic efficiency was maybe not the first objective
of R&P. Political objectives like lessening of union power and widening share ownership were
probably equally important (Green and Haskel, 2004, p. 65). The onset of effective competition
in the second half of the 1990s is associated with strong increases in fuel efficiency. Although
we cannot distinguish between the different mechanisms that increased competition, the timing
of the effects provides some evidence that divestitures were important. When controlling for
entry and exit effects are somewhat smaller, but generally effects do not seem to be driven by
survival.
Privatisation and competition increased productivity as predicted by theories of agency. But
if competition is weak foregone economies of scope might dominate and public owners might
be able to substitute a culture of excellence (combined with internal competition) for market
competition.
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A. Tables
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Table 4: Labour Input Demand Estimates for Break Year 1991
(1) (2)
OLS IV
ln(NET GWH) 0.121∗∗ 0.629
[0.00] [0.10]
ln(CAP) 0.830∗∗∗ 0.406
[0.00] [0.23]
LF 0.114 −1.246
[0.34] [0.23]
AGE 0.086∗∗ 0.079∗
[0.00] [0.03]
ln(WAGE) −0.173∗∗ −0.152∗
[0.01] [0.05]
FGD −0.120 −0.222∗
[0.06] [0.04]
POST1991 −49.869∗∗∗ −50.896∗∗∗
[0.00] [0.00]
Constant 0.056 −1.715
[0.94] [0.10]
Plant Fixed Effects Y es Y es
Year Fixed Effects Y es Y es
Observations 535 535
R2 0.970
p-values in brackets
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of labour input. The IV estimator is 2-stage least squares within.
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Table 5: Fuel Input Demand Estimates for Break Year 1999
(1) (2)
OLS IV
ln(NET GWH) 0.944∗∗∗ 1.206∗∗∗
[0.00] [0.00]
ln(CAP) −0.121∗ −0.396
[0.02] [0.09]
LF −0.162∗ −0.889
[0.01] [0.14]
AGE −0.007 −0.010
[0.73] [0.67]
FGD 0.060 0.036
[0.09] [0.40]
POST1999 −7.993∗∗ −12.598∗∗
[0.00] [0.01]
Constant −6.511∗∗∗ −6.284∗∗∗
[0.00] [0.00]
Plant Fixed Effects Y es Y es
Year Fixed Effects Y es Y es
Observations 909 909
R2 0.991
p-values in brackets
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of fuel input. The IV estimator is 2-stage least squares within.
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B. Variable construction
Where possible we filled missing values as follows. Supply is derived from CO2 emissions
using generic efficiency measures where plant specific efficiency measures are not available. The
formula is:
GWh(Supply) = kt(CO2) ∗ EF ∗ Eff, (6)
where EF is the emissions factor, Eff is thermal efficiency where the values are either plant
specific or if unavailable generic value, and kt stands for thousand tonnes.
Fuel input is derived from CO2. Note that we do not derive fuel input from supply directly.
The formula is:
kt(Fuel) = kt(CO2) ∗ EF ∗ CF ∗ CV, (7)
where CF is a fuel dependent conversion factor and CV is the heat content.
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